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Cognitive scientists have revealed systematic errors in human reasoning. 
There is disagreement about what these errors indicate about human ratio-
nality, but one upshot seems clear: human reasoning does not seem to fit 
traditional views of human rationality. This concern about rationality has 
made its way through various fields and has recently caught the attention 
of philosophers. The concern is that if philosophers are prone to systemat-
ic errors in reasoning, then the integrity of philosophy would be threat-
ened. In this paper, I present some of the more famous work in cognitive 
science that has marshaled this concern. Then I present reasons to think 
that those with training in philosophy will be less prone to certain system-
atic errors in reasoning. The suggestion is that if philosophers could be 
shown to be less prone to such errors, then the worries about the integrity 
of philosophy could be constrained. Then I present evidence that, accord-
ing to performance on the CRT (Frederick 2005), those who have benefit-
ed from training and selection in philosophy are indeed less prone to one 
kind of systematic error: irrationally arbitrating between intuitive and re-
flective responses. Nonetheless, philosophers are not entirely immune to 
this systematic error, and their proclivity for this error is statistically relat-
ed to their responses to a variety of philosophical questions. So, while the 
evidence herein puts constraints on the worries about the integrity of phi-
losophy, it by no means eliminates these worries. The conclusion, then, is 
that the present evidence offers prima facie reasons to ascribe a mitigated 
privilege to philosophers’ ability to rationally arbitrate between intuitive 
and reflective responses. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Cognitive  science  in  the  20th  century  did  well  to,  among  other 
things, cast a cloud of doubt over certain ideals about human rationality. 
Some fields experienced this doubt sooner than others. Perhaps psycholo-
gists were the first to seriously countenance their experimental results that 
highlighted the failures of human reasoning. Later, economists would be-
gin to notice threats to their classical notion of economical rationality—
e.g., “economic man” or homo economics (Mill, 1997). In experiment af-
ter experiment, the behaviors and judgments of both novices and experts 
deviated from logical, mathematical, and economical norms. So through-
out the 20th century it became increasingly uncontroversial to claim that 
human  reasoning,  judgment,  learning,  and  decision-making  could  no 
longer be characterized by the classic notions of rationality, which were 
thoroughly optimistic about humans’ ability to transcend the vestigial cog-
nitive habits that threaten to frustrate our most earnest attempts to conform 
to logical, mathematical, and economical norms. 
It seems that some philosophers have only recently started taking 
seriously the various challenges to the idea that philosophers can be ideal-
ly  analytic,  or  rational,  reasoners.  Some philosophers  have been so in-
trigued  by  these  challenges  that  they  have  taken  to  vacating  their 
metaphorical armchairs for the world of experimental psychology (Alfano 
and Loeb 2014, Knobe et al 2012, Knobe and Nichols 2012, 2013). And as 
more philosophers have learned about the extensive literature that chal-
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lenges traditional ideals about rationality—and others have run their own 
experiments—some concerns about the rationality of philosophical prac-
tice have emerged. These concerns rekindled interest in the empirical and 
conceptual questions surrounding how philosophers reason as well as the 
normative  and  metaphilosophical  questions  about  how  philosophers 
should reason. The remainder of this paper is a humble attempt to con-
tribute something to this topic.
In Section 2, I will highlight some of the more famous research on 
the kinds of reasoning that are most akin to philosophical reasoning. Then, 
in Section 3, I will discuss the nature of philosophical training and selec-
tion, show how they have benefitted from philosophical training and selec-
tion often outperform others on a variety of reasoning tasks, and character-
ize a duality in analytic philosophers’ reasoning. This will bring us to Sec-
tion 4 where I will show how this duality in philosophical thinking fits into 
the larger landscape of dual-process theories in cognitive science. With the 
help of Shane Frederick’s (2005) Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), I will 
distill an overarching dichotomy from various dual-process theories that 
will guide the discussion of reasoning for the remainder of the paper. In 
Section 5, I will look back to Section 3, where I discuss the nature of train-
ing and selection in philosophy, in order to motivate a correlational study 
and furnish predictions about how philosophers will perform on the CRT, 
how training and selection in philosophy will affect performance on the 
CRT, how performance on the CRT will correlate with one’s responses to 
various philosophical questions, and how one’s sex will correlate with per-
formance on this test. Then I will discuss the results, the implications of 
the results, some concerns about the study, and make some suggestions for 
further research. In Section 6, I will conclude that alleged threats to the 
integrity of philosophical reasoning can be mitigated, although not entirely 
eliminated, by the apparently effective training and selection of philoso-
phy departments. This conclusion will by no means resolve the debates 
about human rationality or the rationality of philosophical practice, but it 
will do well to offer provisional constraints on the severity of the concern 
about the rationality of philosophers’ appeals to intuition. 
In the end, concerns about the integrity of philosophy will not be 
fully distinguished. I will show that while philosophical training and selec-
tion might make one significantly less prone to at least one kind of reason-
ing error, philosophers retain a limited proclivity to error and this proclivi-
ty for error is significantly related to some of their philosophical views. 
!
This indicates that philosophers’ reasoning could still have some kind of 
debilitating affect on philosophical discourse or progress.
2.  SOME HISTORY
In order to begin the discussion of the systematic and predictable 
errors in reasoning, I will introduce the study of statistical reasoning—e.g., 
probabilistic  inference  (Bar-Hillel  1973,  Chapman and  Chapman 1967, 
1969, Edwards et al 1968, Epley et al 2004, Epley and Golivoch 2001, 
2006, Evans 1977, Galbraith and Underwood 1973, Hogarth 1975, John-
son-Laird et al 1999, Mans 1970, Rips 1975, Savage 1971, Staël von Hol-
stein 1971). Statistical reasoning tasks often required participants to de-
scribe something statistically or make an inference under conditions that 
impose uncertainty. What these tasks reveal is that it is very common for 
both expert and novice reasoners to make errors in statistical reasoning 
tasks (for a helpful summary of this kind of research, see Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974). Interestingly, patterns and similarities manifest in par-
ticipants’ errors,  implying that  these errors might have been systematic 
and  perhaps  symptomatic  of  a  certain  cognitive  strategy.  Tversky  and 
Kahneman (1974) and others have attempted provide an account of these 
systematic errors by introducing and characterizing these cognitive strate-
gies:  “heuristics  and  biases”  (Evans  1984,  1989;  Gilovich  Griffin  and 
Kahneman 2002, Kahneman et al 2002, Kahneman and Frederick 2005, 
Levinson 1995, Tversky 1974, Tversky and Kahneman 1973). Heuristics 
and biases reduce the complexity and higher-level computation required 
by  certain  tasks  to  simpler  judgments  (Tverksy  and  Kahneman  1974, 
1124). In other words, Kahneman and Tversky claimed that participants 
recruited  heuristics  or  biases  when  answering  certain  statistical  ques-
tions—as opposed to performing complete calculations—and that the re-
cruitment of these heuristics or biases accounted for the patterns and simi-
larities in participants’ errors—e.g., why participants’ answers to various 
statistical questions were apparently insensitive to sample size (ibid., Kah-
neman and Tversky 1973, Shortliffe and Buchanon 1975). 
A newcomer to the field of cognitive science might wonder why 
researchers would waste time speculating about the processes that underly 
a reasoning task. 
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The newcomer might ask, “Why don’t you just ask the reasoner? 
Wouldn’t some reasoners be able to trace the steps of their calculation and 
figure out where they went wrong?” 
The short answer is, “No. Not necessarily.”  The reason is that our 
conscious access to the cognitive processes that lead to our judgments and 
behaviors appears to be limited, fallible, or downright non-veridical. In a 
variety of experiments, most reasoners seemed almost entirely unaware of 
the  cognitive  processes  that  lead  to  their  judgments  and  behaviors 
(Goethals and Reckman 1973, Jack and Roepstorff 2002, 2003, Johansson 
et  al  2005,  Maier  1931,  Nisbett  and Bellows 1977,  Nisbett  and Valins 
1972, Nisbett and Wilson 1977a, 1977b, 1978, Rich 1979, Rosenfeld and 
Baer 1969, Speilberger 1962, Storm and Nisbett  1970, Zell and Krizan 
2014; for replies see Forsyth 1980 and Jack 2013; for outright critiques see 
Lieberman  1979,  Petitmengin  et  al  2013,  Smith  and  Miller  1978,  and 
White 1980). 
In some experiments, participants would be asked to make a judg-
ment about an object or set  of objects.  For example,  some participants 
were asked which of four pairs of stockings was the highest in quality 
(Nisbett and Wilson 1977). Then they were asked to report the process or 
reasons that lead to their judgment. The vast majority of participants chose 
the rightmost pair of stockings. Participants provided various reasons for 
choosing the  right-most  stocking—e.g.,  the  rightmost  pair  of  stockings 
seemed more finely knit. 
In these studies, it can easily be shown that participants’ reported 
reasons were suspect. In the stocking experiment, all four pairs of stock-
ings were identical. It is easy to provide alternative reasons for partici-
pants’ judgments that do a better job of explaining the experimental out-
come than the participants’ own reasons. In retail settings, it is apparently 
common for participants’ to associate position with quality, perhaps be-
cause differences in price—often perceived as an indicator of quality—are 
typically arranged in ascending order from left to right. So, in addition to 
showing a position effect in consumer settings, the stocking experiment 
helps to demonstrate why there would be widespread doubt among cogni-
tive scientists about introspective access to one’s own reasoning processes. 
Now I  can return to statistical  reasoning.  I  have explained why 
one can doubt that we have access to our own reasoning processes. So 
when trying to understand why reasoners seem to make systematic errors 
in statistical reasoning tasks, it simply will not suffice to ask the reasoners 
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where and how they went astray since they will not likely have veridical 
access to the actual cognitive process involved in the judgment(s).
Since the time of these results about statistical reasoning and intro-
spective access to reasoning, other forms of reason have also been studied, 
and with similar results. In an effort to highlight reasoning that might be 
isomorphic to philosophical reasoning, I will turn to logical reasoning—
e.g.,  deductive  and  conditional  reasoning—the  study  of  which  has  re-
vealed  further  systematic  errors  in  reasoning  (Barwise  1993,  Bell  and 
Johnson-Laird-1998, Braine 1998, Bonatti  1994, Cummins 1991, Evans 
1993, 1998, 2002, Evans Newstead and Byrne 1993, Evans Clibbens and 
Rood 1996, Evans, Dugan and Revlin 1990, Hardman and Payne 1995, 
Johnson-Laird  1999,  Johnson-Laird  and  Byrne  2002,  Shynkaruk  and 
Thompson 2006, Thompson 2010, Turner and Thompson 2009, Wetherick 
and Golhooly 1990).  
A famous example of a logical reasoning task is the Wason selec-
tion task (Wason 1977, Evans 1993, Griggs Newstead and Evans 1995, 
Green Over and Pine 1997). It could be useful to attempt the Wason selec-
tion task before continuing. 
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In the Wason Selection task, participants are presented with four 
cards, two of which show numbers and the other two show colors—or let-
ters, depending on the variation. The participants are asked which card(s) 
they must turn over to confirm or falsify the following claim: if a card 
shows an even number of one side, then it’s opposite face is gray. If one is 
trained in formal logic, then one might deduce that only cards with both an 
even number on one face and a non-gray color on the other face are need-
ed to invalidate this rule. Importantly, less than 10% of subjects choose 
these respective cards (ibid., and “Wason Selection Task”). 
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Figure 1. Each card has a number on one side, and a patch of color on the other. 
Which card(s) must be turned over to test the following claim: if a card shows an 
even number on one face, then its opposite face is gray?
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The fact that the vast majority of people seem to systematically 
and predictably fail to deduce the correct answer to the Wason selection 
task is yet another challenge to classic notions of human rationality. This 
might also be an example of recruiting a heuristic instead of a more com-
plex and demanding strategy to solve a reasoning task. 
At this point, I have only mentioned the negative story about hu-
man reasoning. Indeed, I have presented only the view that interprets these 
seeming errors  in  human reasoning as  indications  of  irrationality.  One 
might be surprised to know that there is a positive story to tell about these 
cases of human reasoning.
Cue  Gerd  Gigerenzer  (2008).  Gigerenzer  and  colleagues  have 
skillfully provided an account of how recruiting heuristical and biased rea-
soning strategies instead of more complex and thorough reasoning strate-
gies might, overall, be a good idea. I imagine some readers will already 
have thought of a reason to rely on heuristics: they are more economical 
than the alternatives! And if there is a limited economy of cognitive ener-
gy,  then  recruiting  cognitively  efficient  reasoning  strategies  is  rational, 
right? This is roughly how Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and their ilk 
explain the use of heuristics and biases. This, however, is not Gigerenzer 
and colleagues’ claim.
With  Henry  Brighton  (2009)  and  Wolfgang  Gaissmaier  (2011), 
Gigerenzer demonstrates that recruiting heuristics might be more mathe-
matically rational, and not just more economically rational, then recruiting 
their  alternatives.  First,  Gigerenzer and colleagues introduce their  audi-
ence to a series of strategies, each of which is “biased” to varying degrees, 
that can be used to make estimations under conditions of uncertainty—
e.g., the “take the best” strategy (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996) inspired 
by statistical models using “equal weights” or “tallying” strategies (Dawes 
1974,  1979,  Dawes  and  Corrigan  1974,  Einhorn  and  Hogarth  1975, 
Schmidt 1971). Then Gigerenzer and colleagues show how the differential 
performance of these strategies can be modeled computationally, allowing 
for a quantitative adjudication between strategies. Comparing these esti-
mation strategies across multiple data sets reveals that simpler—or more 
biased—strategies actually outperform models that are more thorough and 
sensitive to variance in the evidence—i.e., variance in the sample data set 
(Chater  et  al  2003,  Goldstein  and  Gigerenzer  2002,  Gigerenzer  and 
Gaissmaier 2011, and Schooler and Hertwig 2005). If these differentially 
biased models of estimation strategies are taken to be analogous to certain 
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kinds of reasoning, then what Gigerenzer and Brighton show is that re-
cruiting biased reasoning strategies—e.g.,  heuristics—might  actually  be 
more rational than recruiting unbiased strategies. Not coincidentally, these 
simulations  seem  to  translate  into  ecologically  valid  human  reasoning 
tasks (Hertwig and Todd 2003 and Gigerenzer 2007, 2008), meaning, sim-
ple-is-best or “less-is-more” cognitive strategies—where reasoners uncon-
sciously estimate rather than fully calculate—are not only economically 
rational, but mathematically rational as well.
While there are reasons to accept that claim, it is by no means un-
controversial or indefeasible. And it is important to note that even if one 
adopts Gigerenzer and colleagues’ optimistic view of heuristics and biases, 
one still needs to face the fact that heuristics and biases inevitably result in 
some amount of error. In other words, even the optimistic view of biased 
reasoning fails to salvage the classic notion of perfect rationality. Further-
more, one can notice that heuristics will  tend to outperform their more 
thorough and complex strategies  only across  multiple  tasks or  task-do-
mains, meaning that it will not always be rational to rely on a heuristic.
We began this  section  assuming that  rationality  entailed  always 
and only complying with mathematical, logical, and/or economical norms. 
Then we discovered that this assumption contained problems. The work of 
Gigerenzer and colleagues has done well to modify this original perspec-
tive. The result is a sort of context-sensitive view of rationality (Gigerenz-
er and Hug 1992). According to this view, there will be circumstances in 
which being optimally rational entails complying with mathematical, logi-
cal,  and/or  economical  norms,  but  there  will  also  be  circumstances  in 
which being optimally rational requires recruiting heuristics and biases. 
This middle view—that the quality of a cognitive strategy is not absolute, 
but context-sensitive—serves as a handy segue into the topic of philosoph-
ical reasoning.
3.  PHILOSOPHICAL REASONING
Given that the rational reasoning strategy might be context-depen-
dent, I can now pose the question of whether philosophy is a context in 
which logical, mathematical, and economical reasoning will turn out to be 
more rational or if it is a context in which heuristical and biased reasoning 
will be more rational. If one tried seriously to answer this question, I think 
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they would find that the dichotomy I have just  suggested is a mistake. 
Philosophers seem to prize both of the reasoning strategies we have dis-
cussed so far, so it will not be so easy to claim that only one reasoning 
strategy will reign in the domain of philosophy. Having posed this ques-
tion and mentioned a possible difficulty in providing a one-sided answer, I 
can begin to present further details about philosophy that will help guide 
the rest of this paper. 
There is some reason to think that philosophers could be called ex-
pert reasoners of some kind since philosophers outperform non-philoso-
phers on various reasoning tasks. For example, philosophy majors outper-
form almost all other majors on the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) 
(see Educational Testing Service 2013) and the Law School Admission 
Test (LSAT) (see Nieswiadomy 2009, Table 1 and Table 2). Given that 
much of the LSAT is testing for competence in logical reasoning compe-
tence and multiple sections of the GRE are testing for mathematical com-
petence, we might wonder if philosophy majors are, for whatever reason, 
better at quantitative reasoning. This would not be surprising in light of 
the fact most US philosophy departments require their students to take a 
course in formal logic—the mastery of which requires more than a mod-
icum of quantitative competence (Prowse Tur and Thompson 2009). 
But quantitative competence does not fully capture the robust per-
formance of philosophy majors since philosophy majors also outperform 
most of their peers in non-quantitative domains as well—e.g., the verbal 
and analytical writing section of the GRE. This apparent rhetorical or lin-
guistic competency might also be attributable to education since philoso-
phy majors are often graded, directly or indirectly, on the quality of their 
reading  comprehension  and  argumentation.  So  perhaps  the  outstanding 
performance of philosophy majors on various non-quantitative reasoning 
tasks is also, at least in part, a result of their training. 
Consider  also  the  fact  that  being  a  professional  philosopher  re-
quires surviving multiple stages of highly competitive selection. For ex-
ample graduate programs in philosophy often receive hundreds of applica-
tions and accept only a handful of students each year. Since only the top 
graduate students are admitted, and since the merits of each graduate stu-
dent are either directly or indirectly related to various reasoning compe-
tencies, one might expect that reasoning performance would be saliently 
higher among students as a function of whether or not one has been admit-
ted to a philosophy graduate program. Here I am making the case that 
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philosophical selection and training might account for the increase in cer-
tain reasoning competencies. 
To make this point more salient, I will briefly outline additional 
selection processes in academic philosophy. In graduate school students 
complete qualifying papers or qualifying exams to maintain their candida-
cy for a graduate degree and students also write and defend thesis or dis-
sertation defenses in order to receive their degree. It would not be surpris-
ing if these processes also had a beneficial affect on philosophers’ reason-
ing competence.
And philosophers  face further  selection processes after  graduate 
school in the way of hiring and promotion. It is unclear, however, whether 
these processes end up selecting for reasoning ability. It  seems entirely 
possible that  these processes merely select  for  something else,  like the 
ability to make professional connections, to start new projects, to complete 
those projects, to meet deadlines, and to make a good impression, etc.—
i.e., those abilities that result in more publications on one’s curriculum vi-
tae and better recommendations from one’s colleagues. 
With some sense of how philosophers are trained and selected at 
the undergraduate, graduate, and professional level, I can go on to make 
some predictions.  In  addition to  expecting professional  philosophers  to 
perform better  on  average  on  certain  reasoning  tasks  than  others,  one 
would expect to find a positive correlation between reasoning ability and 
having or being a candidate for a PhD in philosophy and the number of 
years  one  has  been  studying  philosophy.  However,  because  hiring  and 
promotion might not select for reasoning competence, one would not ex-
pect to find a correlation between reasoning ability and whether someone 
is employed to teach philosophy.
One might also wonder about the gender distributions in profes-
sional philosophy. The profession of philosophy has become increasingly 
aware of the fact that philosophy departments tend to employ relatively 
few women (Buckwalter and Stich 2011). There are a variety of views 
about why this is the case, but there is some evidence that implicit bias at 
various stages in the undergraduate, graduate, and career-level training and 
selection processes could result  in fewer opportunities for advancement 
for women (Paxton Figdor and Tiberius 2012, Stier and Yaish 2014). In an 
effort to counteract such biases, departments openly utilize affirmative ac-
tion policies in their selection processes. Such policies usually require that 
when two candidates are equally qualified, and one candidate is underrep-
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resented in philosophy, then the underrepresented individual will be cho-
sen. If this is indeed how the affirmative action policies work, and if rea-
soning ability is among the dimensions on which two candidates could be 
equally qualified, then we should not expect to find large differences in 
reasoning performance among philosophers who have survived a selection 
process as a function of gender.
There is at least one further prediction. It will require some expla-
nation. The reader may remember that this section began with a comment 
about  heuristics  and  biases  on  the  one  hand  and  the  formally  logical, 
mathematical, and/or economical reasoning strategies on the other. This 
came right after the suggestion that the use of one of these strategies over 
the other is not rational or irrational in itself. Instead, the rationality of us-
ing one of these strategies over the other was taken to depend on context. I 
also implied that philosophy might be a domain where both strategies are 
employed, depending on the context. 
Consider  the  nature  of  argumentation  in  analytic  philosophy. 
Philosophers try to craft a series of premises that have a certain logical 
structure such that if the premises are true, then the conclusion must also 
be true. The ability to achieve this logical structure—and notice faults in 
the logical structure of arguments—is probably the most important tool in 
the analytic philosophers tool belt. 
But consider how difficult it can be to show that one’s premises are 
true. After all, not all premises are subject to empirical investigation and 
conceptual analysis might not conclusively arbitrate the truth-value of a 
premise. Perhaps this is why philosophers will argue, explicitly or implic-
itly, that premises can be considered true or false in virtue of their intuitive 
appeal—viz., the premise just seems to be true or false (Audi 2004, Bealer 
1998,  Huemer  2005,  Nagel  2007,  2013).  There  is  little  question  that 
philosophers make these kinds of  appeals  (Audi 2004,  Kornblith 1998, 
Talbot 2009, Chalmers 2013; for an opposing view, see Cappelen 2012). 
So, it seems that in addition to logical competence, analytic philosophers 
must also demonstrate some kind of competence in exercising intuition—
including, perhaps, the intuition of their interlocutors. 
I  take  this  difference  between  intuitive  competence  and  logical 
competence  to  be  loosely  similar  to  the  aforementioned  difference  be-
tween heuristic or biased reasoning strategies and logical, mathematical, 
or economical reasoning strategies. It will be helpful to simplify this dis-
tinction to a distinction between intuitive reasoning and reflective reason-
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ing.  For the remainder of the paper, ‘intuitive’ will refer to seemings or 
responses that are relatively effortless, possibly automatic, possibly asso-
ciative, and prior to reflection. Conversely, ‘reflective’ will refer to judg-
ments or responses that are relatively more effortful, calculative, and/or 
rule-based. 
I have already highlighted how philosophers’ training might im-
prove  their  reflective  competence.  One  might  go  as  far  as  to  say  that 
philosophers’ training and selection improves their reflective competency 
more than it improves intuitive competency. Indeed, one might even con-
cede that intuitive competency simply does not benefit from training and 
selection in philosophy. After all, it is not obvious how one would (inten-
tionally)  train  one’s  intuitive  competency  or  how intuitive  competency 
would be selected for. 
This reveals the final expectation: that philosophers’ training and 
selection will result in their being more likely than non-philosophers to 
overcome intuitive responses with reflective responses when the intuitive 
response is inferior to the reflective response. I will revisit this in the next 
two sections, so for now I can table further discussion of philosophical 
training and selection and how this might predict certain outcomes on rea-
soning tasks. For now, let me return to our discussion of the seeming di-
chotomy between two kinds of reasoning strategies. 
4.  DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES
The aforementioned characterization of philosophical reasoning—
i.e., the duality between intuitive reasoning and reflective reasoning—is by 
no means being doctored for the purposes of this paper. There is a resem-
blance to this dichotomy going back to ancient philosophy—‘deliberation’ 
vs.  ‘impulse’ in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics  Book III,  2-4 (Barnes 
1984, 1111b4-1113b15) and Alexander of Aphrodisias’s On Fate (Sharples 
1983, 178.8-179.9)—as well as more recent philosophy—e.g., the salient 
differences between an intuitive response and a calculated utilitarian re-
sponse that arise in certain thought experiments—e.g.,  the trolley cases 
(Hare 1981, 139-40), organ cases, etc. Perhaps more importantly, this di-
chotomy in reasoning strategies seems to have fallen quite naturally out of 
the empirical research on reasoning, learning, social cognition, and deci-
!11
sion making (for a relatively brief, useful, and accessible introduction see 
Frankish 2010). 
Theories and models that endorse or assume the kind of dichoto-
my just described are often referred to as dual-process or dual-system the-
ories (Chaiken and Trope 1999, Evans 2003, 2008, 2014a, 2014b, Evans 
and Stanovich 2013, Frankish 2010, Hammond 1996, Samuels 2009, Slo-
man 1996, 2002, Smith and DeCoster 2000, Thompson 2009, 2010, 2013, 
Wilson  Lindsey  and  Schooler  2000).  The  duality  referred  to  by  ‘dual-
process’ has many names, each with it’s own story: associative vs. rule-
based  (Sloman  1996),  heuristic  vs.  analytic  (Evans  1984,  1989),  tacit 
thought vs. explicit thought (Evans and Over 1996), implicit cognition vs. 
explicit learning (Reber 1989), interactional vs. analytic (Levinson 1995), 
experiential vs. rational (Epstein 1994), quick and inflexive modules vs. 
intellection  (Pollock  1991),  intuitive  cognition  vs.  analytical  cognition 
(Hammond 1996), recognition primed choice vs. rational choice strategy 
(Klein  1998),  implicit  inference  vs.  explicit  inference  (Johnson-Laird 
1983), automatic vs. controlled processing (Shiffrin and Schneider 1977), 
automatic activation vs. conscious processing system (Posner and Snyder 
1975, 2004), rationality1 vs. rationality2 (Evans & Over 1996, 1997), intu-
itive vs. reflective (Frederick 2005), model-based vs. model-free (Daw et 
al 2005) and system 1 vs. system 2 (see Stanovich and West 2000 for the 
first mention of these terms as well as a useful, albeit dated, list of dual-
process terminology; see also Frankish 2010 for a list of features common-
ly associated with System 1 and System 2). While there are nuanced dif-
ferences between certain dual-process theories, dual-process theories are 
those which claim that one can distinguish between at least two cognitive 
strategies  in  reasoning,  learning,  deciding,  etc.—I emphasize  that  there 
might  be  more  than  two processes  to  avoid  problems  that  result  from 
positing “binary oppositions” (Newell 1973). One strategy is characterized 
by quick, effortless, and possibly associative seemings—referred to in this 
paper as intuitive—and the other of which is characterized by longer, more 
effortful, deliberative, perhaps calculative or even rule-based judgments—
referred to in this paper as reflective. Although it is not entirely clear how 
these two strategies operate (e.g., serially vs. in parallel), how these strate-
gies interact (e.g., competitively vs. non-competitively, mutually inhibito-
rily vs. complementarily, etc.), how these strategies are realized neurobio-
logically, or what these strategies actually are (e.g.,  systems, processes, 
styles, habits, personality traits, etc.), there are a variety of reasoning tasks 
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that demonstrate the dissociability of the two strategies (see Sloman 1996 
for a helpful summary). 
The Cognitive Reflection Test
In this paper, I will focus on a set of tasks that are designed to cue an intu-
itive response, which, upon reflection, can be shown to be false. These 
tasks  are  found  in  the  Cognitive  Reflection  Test—henceforth  the  CRT 
(Frederick 2005). Take a look at an example of a CRT question (Figure 2); 
it could be useful to try to answer the question before continuing. 
!
The question is designed to elicit a particular intuitive response: 10 
cents. This response is quick and effortless. It is also false. In order to ex-
plain why this is incorrect, consider the two criteria that need to be satis-
fied to correctly answer this question.
Criterion 1: The cost of the bat and the ball must total $1.10. 
Criterion 2: The bat must cost $1.00 more than the ball.
Notice that answering “10 cents” does not violate Criterion 1 by 
itself. After all, if the ball costs 10 cents, then Criterion 1 can be satisfied 
so long as the total cost comes to $1.10. So far, so good. A problem will 
arise, however, when we attempt to fulfill Criterion 2. We realize that if 
the ball costs 10 cents, then Criterion 2 requires that the bat cost $1.10, 
and when we add these two costs, the total is $1.20—which fails to satisfy 
Criterion 1. So if the ball costs 10 cents, then either Criteria 1 or Criterion 
2 will not be satisfied.
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs 
$1.00 more than the ball. How much does the 
ball cost?
______ cents
Figure 2. Example of a CRT Question (Frederick 2005)
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Demonstrating an analysis of the solution indicates how arriving at 
the correct answer would require a reflective strategy. Ideally, this reflec-
tive process would result in the correct answer: 5 cents. 
Shane Frederick (2005) created the CRT to demonstrate a certain 
kind of cognitive ability: namely the ability to overcome seemingly correct 
responses that turn out to be incorrect. But there is another use for the 
CRT. Since the CRT elicits specific intuitive responses and since the cor-
rect answer to a CRT question requires a reflective process, one can use 
CRT responses to distinguish between intuitive and reflective reasoning. 
That  is,  if  a  subject  reports  the  quick and effortless  response (e.g.,  10 
cents), then one can infer the use of intuitive reasoning. And if a subject 
reports the answer that requires deliberation and calculation (e.g., 5 cents), 
then one can infer the use of reflective reasoning—it might be worth not-
ing that Frederick (2005) uses ‘style’ instead of ‘reasoning.’
One can also treat the CRT as a test of rationality in a specific do-
main. That is, the CRT can reveal a test-takers proclivity to respond intu-
itively vs. reflectively when it is rational to respond reflectively.
There are a variety of interesting effects related to whether one an-
swers intuitively or reflectively on the CRT. Historically, intuitive respons-
es (e.g., 10 cents) were significantly related to being more willing to take 
risks to avoid losses than to achieve gains (Frederick 2005, Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979), reporting more confident belief in God—even after con-
trolling for education level, income, political orientation, IQ, and personal-
ity,  and  various  demographic  variables—(Shenhav  Rand  and  Greene 
2012) reporting increased confidence in God’s existence since childhood 
(ibid.), reporting belief in immortal souls (ibid.), and reporting experiences 
that convinced oneself of God’s existence (ibid.).
Similarly, reflective responses (e.g., 5 cents) were significantly re-
lated to being more patient (Frederick 2005), being more likely to choose 
larger-later rewards—as opposed to smaller-sooner rewards—(ibid.), be-
ing less sensitive to temporal discounting rates (ibid.), being more willing 
to gamble (ibid.), being less risk-seeking (ibid.), performing better in the 
American College Test (ACT) (ibid.), performing better on the Scholastic 
Aptitude Test (SAT) (ibid.), performing better on the Wonderlic Personnel 
Test (WPT) (ibid.), scoring higher on the Need For Cognition scale (NFC) 
(ibid.), having greater vocabulary IQ (Shenhav Rand and Greene 2012), 
demonstrating  better  matrix  reasoning  (ibid.),  and  demonstrating  better 
probabilistic reasoning competence (Oechssler Roider and Schmitz 2009). 
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There have also been significant gender differences. After control-
ling for SATmath scores and CRT score itself, men answered reflectively 
significantly more than women—even though there are no significant gen-
der differences in performance on the ACT, SATverbal, WPT, or NFC (Fred-
erick 2005). Also, among those who answered incorrectly, women were 
more likely than men to respond intuitively— e.g., 10 cents (ibid.). Also, 
aforementioned  correlations,  like  those  between  CRT performance  and 
being more or less likely to choose larger-later (LL) rewards, were more 
salient for women than men (ibid.). Some of these findings—for example 
the finding that women were more likely then men to respond intuitive-
ly—are consistent with other dual-process task results (Aarnio and Lin-
deman 2005, Lieberman 2000, Pacini and Epstein 1999).  
There are  also priming effects  related to  intuitive and reflective 
reasoning. For example, priming an intuitive reasoning strategy increases 
one’s likelihood of reporting being convinced that God exists (Shenhav 
Rand and Greene 2012). This result aligns with other results in which intu-
itive thinking correlates positively with religious and paranormal beliefs 
(Aarnio and Lindeman 2005 Giannotti et al 2001, Pennycook et al 2012, 
Pennycook  et  al  2013,  Pennycook  [comments]  2013,  Pennycook  et  al 
2014a, 2014b, 2014c). Also of interest is the effect that priming the reflec-
tive strategy results in being more likely to make utilitarian moral judg-
ments about a variety of scenarios (Paxton, Ungar, and Greene 2012).
It is also worth noting that in a large study (n > 4000) philosophers 
were shown to be significantly more likely than non-philosophers to an-
swer reflectively on the CRT (Livengood et al 2010): that is, training and 
selection in philosophy positively correlated with CRT performance. 
Characterizing The Intuitive-Reflective Dichotomy
At this point, one might be assuming that the reflective strategy is always 
the best strategy. While this seems to be true in the case of the CRT, it is 
not clear how robust the superiority of reflection will be. There is some 
reason to think that there are limitations to the benefits of reflection. For 
example, there is evidence that thinking “too much” can actually lead to 
poorer  judgments  (Hertwig  and  Schooler  2003,  Wilson  and  Schooler 
1991). So, one should not necessarily conclude, at this point, that answer-
ing reflectively is indicative of a robustly optimal rational competence. It 
might be that answering reflectively is only the most rational strategy in 
certain  domains—e.g.,  formal  mathematical  tasks,  formal  logical  tasks, 
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etc. But even this view might be challenged by the work of Gigerenzer and 
colleagues—see Section 2. 
Also, I have been characterizing performance on the CRT in more 
than one way. In some instances, I characterize the dichotomy as the like-
lihood to recruit either the intuitive or the reflective reasoning, as if the 
two strategies are exclusive or mutually inhibitory. This is by no means the 
only way to characterize the differences in performance. It seems possible 
that intuition and reflection could function in tandem—a possibility that I 
accept. If so, then one might wonder whether and how intuition and reflec-
tion interact. One possibility is that reflection can double-check and possi-
bly  correct  one’s  initial  intuitive  responses—this  might  be  Frederick’s 
(2005) view. This description assumes a certain ordering of the two strate-
gies: namely, the intuitive strategy comes first—this seems to be consistent 
with Huemer’s (2005, 101-103) view. Accepting this possibility might en-
tail that all reasoners could register an intuitive response before having a 
chance to recruit the reflective strategy. And there is yet a third way to 
characterize the differences in performance on the CRT. In this characteri-
zation, one would grant the possibility that both intuitive and reflective 
reasoning can operate simultaneously. This allows for multiple characteri-
zations of arbitration between intuitive and reflective responses. 
One possibility is that the two responses are in a winner-takes-all 
competition.  On this  characterization,  answers to CRT questions would 
indicate which response won the competition. That is, if a reasoner an-
swers intuitively, then one can infer that, for whatever reason, the intuitive 
response won out over the reflective response—and vice versa. Another 
possibility is  that  some independent process arbitrates between the two 
responses—cognitive  scientists  might  hypothesize  that  part  of  the  pre-
frontal cortex or the anterior cingulate cortex could play a role in this arbi-
tration (Miller and Cohen 2001, Neys Vartanian and Goel 2008).  
A view that might be consistent with more than one of these char-
acterizations is the view that people tend to be satisfied with their intuitive 
responses unless they sense some indication of difficulty about the task, in 
which case they might rely on a more reflective response (Alter et al 2007, 
2013, Simmons and Nelson 2006, Thompson and Johnson 2014). It is too 
early to tell whether these results are generalizable to philosophers. 
One of the purposes in considering the various characterizations is 
to caution the reader from adopting one characterization without consider-
ing other possibilities (Livengood et al 2010). Another purpose is to take a 
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minute to appreciate some of the theoretical possibilities concerning the 
relationship between intuitive and reflective responses. Another purpose of 
presenting these various views is to admit that my final conclusion will 
commit me to some kind of arbitration between intuitive and reflective 
responses. I should be clear that while I assume this kind of arbitration, I 
by no means assume that the arbitration in consciously accessible (Neys 
Vartanian Goel 2008). I should also admit that I remain agnostic about 
which of  the  two aforementioned arbitration processes  explains  perfor-
mance in the CRT. 
I have tried to outline the relationship between the intuitive and 
reflective responses. Now I will consider how to characterize each strategy 
individually.  In  the  past,  System  1—herein  the  intuitive  strategy—has 
been described by cognitive scientists  as  quick (Kahneman 2011,  Mar-
tignon and Hoffrage 2002, Thompson Evans and Campbell 2013) and as-
sociative (Sloman 1996, Talbot 2009) and System 2—herein the reflective 
strategy—has been described as rule-based (Sloman 1996), explicit (Evans 
and Over 1996, Reber 1989, Johnson-Laird 1983), controlled (Shiffrin and 
Schneider 1977), and conscious (Posner and Snyder 1975, 2004). I want to 
briefly distinguish my position on these descriptions. 
I will begin with the claim that intuitive responses will be quick. I 
think the claim is acceptable so long as by ‘quick’ one means relatively 
quick, where ‘relative’ refers to the individual. In other words, for any giv-
en reasoner, intuitive responses will probably become apparent relatively 
faster than reflective responses. However, this description does not entail 
that each reasoner’s intuitive and reflective responses will become appar-
ent within the same amount of time as another reasoner’s responses. For 
instance, one reasoner, perhaps an expert,  might have responded reflec-
tively in the same amount of time that another reasoner, perhaps a novice, 
was only able to respond intuitively. This difference might seem unimpor-
tant, so I will briefly explain its significance. It is often assumed in cogni-
tive science that relatively quick judgments and reaction times are the tell-
tale signs of System 1, or intuitive reasoning. In other words if participants 
respond in a few seconds or as few as a few hundred milliseconds, then 
this reaction time is taken as sufficient evidence that the response was in-
tuitive. Since this assumption might be faulty—as in the expert-novice ex-
ample above—the practice of identifying intuitive responses, or System 1 
responses in general, by reaction times (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996) 
might be subject to a kind of misattribution error. 
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Intuitive  responses  have  also  been  characterized  as,  necessarily, 
associative (Talbot 2009). Now I will express a concern about this associa-
tionist conception of the intuitive strategy. The associationist about intu-
ition will start by outlining a fairly well accepted tenet of cognitive sci-
ence: whether or not we are aware of it, we are more or less constantly 
learning associations between things and properties of things via experi-
ence—e.g., if we frequently experience two things or properties of things 
together, then we will begin to associate them (Reber 1989, 1992, Talbot 
2009, 28-48). The associationist will then point out that many associations 
are not consciously accessible and that one of the things consciously inac-
cessible associations do is influence consciously inaccessible judgments. 
The final claim is this: “intuitions are the conscious manifestation of [con-
sciously inaccessible] judgments” (Talbot, 38). While parts of this view 
enjoy impressive empirical support and while this view offers good de-
scriptions of some intuitions, I am not convinced that this view can capture 
everything that falls under the umbrella of ‘intuition’ in either cognitive 
science or philosophy. For example, it  is rather unclear how an uncon-
scious association would lead to an unconscious judgment that would lead 
to the response of “10 cents” on the aforementioned CRT question (Figure 
2). 
Now I can turn to the descriptions of what I have called the reflec-
tive strategy. I will begin with ‘ruled-based.’ While I understand the moti-
vation for this term—namely, that reflection and calculation might require 
some kind of logico-mathematico rule following process—it is not clear 
that this will be enough to distinguish the intuitive strategy from the reflec-
tive strategy. After all, the processes which underlie intuition might, at bot-
tom, also instantiate rule following. In fact, even associative processes that 
are allegedly juxtaposed to rule-based processes (Sloman 1996) could be 
realized by a set of production rules (Eisenstadt and Simon 1997). The 
plausibility of this claim becomes clearer when one thinks about how both 
associative and rule-based cognitive processes can be modeled mathemati-
cally and computationally—that is, both can be instantiated by rule-fol-
lowing systems. 
I have a single concern with descriptions such as “explicit,” “con-
trolled,” and “conscious.” To make the concern apparent, consider a dif-
ference between expert  and novice reasoning.  Expert  chess  players  are 
surely reasoning reflectively even if, unlike novices, much of their judg-
ments and inferences are so well trained that they are consciously inacces-
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sible. Indeed, they may not be able to exercise control over these judg-
ments and might not be able to explicitly report on them during their rea-
soning. So if the requirements for reflective reasoning require explicit or 
conscious control, then expert reflection might be miscategorized as non-
reflective.  
Meanwhile, philosophers do not agree on their notions of intuition 
(Kuntz and Kuntz 2011), perhaps because some are motivated by a favor-
able  view of  intuition  (Audi  2004,  Bealer  1998,  Huemer  2005,  Nagel 
2007, 2013a, 2013b, Sosa 2006, 2007) and others are not (Swain Alexan-
der Weinberg 2008, Weinberg 2007, Vaesen Peterson and Van Bezooijen 
2013). For example George Bealer (1998) bends over backwards to distin-
guish ‘intuition’ from all empirically tractable concepts. His motivation for 
doing this, no doubt, is to arrive at a conclusion that allows for intuitions 
to count as evidence that can provide philosophers with uniquely powerful 
epistemic  justifications  in  spite  of  damning  empirical  results.  Michael 
Huemer has a similar motivation, but his definition of ‘intuition’ as “an 
intellectual  appearance”  or  “the  way  things  seem  prior  to 
reasoning” (2005, 101-102), while not being operationally defined, is more 
amenable to empirical investigation than Bealer’s. Indeed, Huemer’s defi-
nition of ‘intuition’ might even be consistent with what I have been calling 
intuitive in this paper. Since I am trying to cast a distinction between two 
reasoning  styles  in  philosophy  rather  than  weigh  in  on  the  debate  of 
whether intuitions can count as evidence, we can set aside further discus-
sion of what an intuition is and whether it can provide epistemological jus-
tification. 
Summary
At this point it should be clear how intuitive and reflective responses fit 
into the landscape of dual-process theories and how performance on the 
CRT correlates with important differences between both reasoning ability 
and philosophical dispositions. The reader should also feel more familiar 
with characterizations of the dual-process dichotomy itself as well as each 
the various descriptions of each side of the dichotomy. More importantly, 
the reasons for avoiding certain descriptions and definitions of ‘intuitive’ 
or ‘reflective’ should be clear. With this background and clarification, I can 
move on to the next section, where I will consider a study of how philo-
sophical training and selection correlates with performance on the CRT 
and how intuitive and reflective responses are differentially related to posi-
!19
tions on central philosophical questions, regardless of one’s training and 
selection in philosophy.
5.  A CORRELATIONAL STUDY
Introduction
In Section 3, I mentioned that philosophy majors outperform most other 
majors on the LSAT and the GRE. In Section 4, I mentioned that philo-
sophical  training is  positively correlated with performance on the CRT 
(Livengood et al 2010). This might be unsurprising given that reasoners 
with higher levels of analytic intelligence—perhaps those who have en-
joyed philosophical training and selection—will tend to respond reflective-
ly on various reasoning tasks (McCelroy and Seta 2003, Stanovich and 
West 2000). Naturally, then we should expect that having or being a can-
didate for a PhD in philosophy will positively correlate with answering 
reflectively on the CRT. 
The reader will also recall from Section 4 that intuitive responses 
on the CRT were significantly correlated with being convinced that God 
exists, with general belief in God, and with belief in immortal souls. Re-
call also that priming intuition resulted in reporting stronger belief in God 
and that priming reflection resulted in a greater likelihood of making utili-
tarian moral judgments. Based on these results, one might expect that peo-
ple who have enjoyed philosophical training and selection will tend not to 
be theists and tend to make utilitarian judgments in certain scenarios. 
There were also gender effects in previous CRT data. Women were 
more likely than men to answer intuitively on the CRT. So one might 
wonder if this gender effect survives philosophical training and selection. 
Method
A total of 562 subjects (111 female) from 36 countries—with more than 
375 from the US—participated in a survey. The survey contained demo-
graphic questions, questions about ones position on central philosophical 
topics, and the CRT—in that order. Philosophers—undergraduates, gradu-
ates, and professionals—were recruited from LeiterReports.com and non-
philosophers were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
In the section concerning one’s philosophical position, the PhilPa-
pers survey questions were used (Bourget et al 2009). Since many of the 
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PhilPapers questions require a familiarity with various topics in philoso-
phy, the questions were adapted for some survey participants.  At some 
point in the survey, subjects were asked if they had or were a candidate for 
a  PhD in philosophy.  Those who answered “yes” (n=318) received the 
same questions that appeared in the PhilPapers survey (2009). Those who 
answered “no”  (n=244) to this question received more accessible adapta-
tions of the questions (Figure 3). All but one of the philosophical questions 
required participants to choose between one of two positions. Similar to 
the format of the PhilPapers survey, participants indicated that they ac-
cepted one position, leaned towards one position, didn’t know, or had no 
inclination (Figure 3).
Participants were also presented with the CRT. The first question 
(see Figure 2) was adapted in order to be more amenable to those who are 
less  familiar  with  bats  and  balls—‘bat’ and  ‘ball’ were  replaced  with 
‘notebook’ and ‘pencil,’ respectively. To control for familiarity with the 
CRT, subjects were asked whether they were familiar with the questions in 
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(if PhD in Philosophy) 
Free will: incompatibilism or compatibilism?
__ Accept: incompatibilism
__ Lean toward: incompatibilism
__ I don’t know
__ No Inclination 
__ Lean toward: compatibilism
__ Accept: compatibilism 
(if No PhD in Philosophy) 
If every event in the universe is determined, do you 
think it is possible that there could be free will?
__ Accept: no
__ Lean toward: no
__ I don’t know
__ No Inclination
__ Lean toward: yes
__ Accept: yes
Figure 3. Example of original and adapted PhilPapers question (Bourget et al 
2009)
the CRT and whether they knew any of the answers to the CRT before tak-
ing the survey. Following the design of Frederick 2005, the CRT instruc-
tions consisted in the following two sentences. Below are a series of math 
questions of varying difficulty. Please answer as many as you can. 
Subjects who did not consent, did not complete the survey, or did 
not take the survey seriously—e.g., one subject reported being a citizen of 
“Narnia”—were eliminated from the sample. All of the of the remaining 
data (n = 562) was included in all the following analysis. 
Results
One measure of performance on the CRT is a CRT score (Frederick 2005, 
Paxton Ungar and Greene 2012), which is the number of questions an-
swered correctly. Since there are three questions, 3.0 is the highest possi-
ble score. As predicted, having or being a candidate for a PhD in philoso-
phy was positively correlated with CRT score (Cohen 1977). After control-
ling for previous familiarity with the CRT, those who had or were a candi-
date for a PhD in philosophy had a higher CRT score, on average, by 0.28; 
F(1, 558) = 15.41, p < 0.001, d = 0.32. Contrary to my predictions, the 
number of years spent studying philosophy, after accounting for whether 
or not one had or was a candidate for a PhD in philosophy, was not signifi-
cantly related to one’s CRT score, but as predicted, teaching philosophy 
was not statistically related to CRT score.
Since the CRT score is an indication of how likely someone is to 
report a reflective answer, it might also be useful to have a metric of how 
likely someone is to report an intuitive answer. Let us call this an intuit 
score, which is the number of questions, out of three, that were answered 
with an intuitive response (e.g. 10 cents)—notice that incorrect responses 
are not necessarily intuitive responses. Similar to the last result, having or 
being a candidate for a PhD in philosophy was negatively correlated with 
one’s intuit score. After controlling for previous familiarity with the CRT 
and sex, those who had or were a candidate for a PhD in philosophy had a 
lower intuit score, on average by 0.23; F(1, 557) = 14.72, p < 0.001, d = 
0.31. And contrary to my predictions, the number of years spent studying 
philosophy, after accounting for whether or not one had or was a candidate 
for a PhD in philosophy, was not significantly related to one’s intuit score
—but as predicted, teaching philosophy was also not statistically related to 
CRT score.
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Also, one’s likelihood to respond intuitively was positively corre-
lated with reporting theist inclinations. After controlling for whether or not 
one had or was a candidate for a PhD in philosophy, each intuitive re-
sponse on the CRT was significantly related to being more likely to report 
either leaning toward or accepting theism; F(1, 559) = 7.3, p < 0.01, d = 
0.16, b = 0.12. Responding intuitively was also was positively correlated 
with a Fregean view of language. Above and beyond the impact of one’s 
familiarity with the CRT, every intuitive answer provided on the CRT was 
correlated  with  being  more  likely  to  report  being  inclined  toward  a 
Fregean, as opposed to a Russellian, view of language; F(1, 558) = 8.59, p 
< 0.01, d = 0.17, b = 0.19. There was also a marginally significant rela-
tionship between answering intuitively and one’s view on scientific real-
ism. For every intuitive response on the CRT, one was more likely to be an 
anti-realist about science; F(1, 560) = 4.26, p < 0.05, d =  0.12, b = 0.11—
it should be noted that this result becomes statistically insignificant after 
controlling for familiarity with the CRT. Also as predicted, intuitive re-
sponses were correlated with less utilitarian responses to the trolley prob-
lem. After controlling for whether or not one had or was a candidate for a 
PhD in philosophy, intuitive responses on the CRT were negatively corre-
lated with pulling the switch to save five and kill one; F(1, 559) = 6.93,  p 
< 0.001, d = 0.15, b = 0.17. And as predicted, having or being a candidate 
for a PhD in philosophy is correlated with being significantly more likely 
to make a utilitarian judgment on the trolley problem. After controlling for 
one’s likelihood of responding intuitively on the CRT, having or being a 
candidate for a PhD in philosophy is positively correlated with pulling the 
switch; F(1, 559) = 11.82, p < 0.001, d = 0.29, b = 0.32. Similarly, being 
prone to reflective responses on the CRT was also related to making utili-
tarian judgments on the trolley problem. For every reflective answer pro-
vided on the CRT, one was significantly more likely to pull the switch; 
F(1, 558) = 5.5, p < 0.05, d = 0.1, b = 0.13. Finally, answering intuitively 
was positively correlated with being a physicalist about personal identity. 
That is, after controlling for previous familiarity with the CRT, responding 
intuitively was associated with accepting the physical (as opposed to the 
psychological) view of personal identity; F(1, 558) = 8.57, p < 0.001, d = 
0.17, b = 0.22. 
Furthermore, the present results were similar to extant gender ef-
fects.  In this sample, one’s sex (male or female) as well as one’s gender 
was correlated with one’s likelihood to answer reflectively or intuitively. 
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After controlling for familiarity with the CRT and whether one had or was 
a candidate for a PhD in philosophy, males’ CRT scores were higher by 
0.27—that is, males were more likely than females to answer reflectively; 
F(1, 557) = 8.95, p < 0.01, d = 0.30. In the same comparison, after ac-
counting for sex and familiarity with the CRT, having or being a candidate 
for a PhD in philosophy increased one’s CRT score by 0.29 F(1, 557) = 
16.03,  p  < 0.0001,  d  = 0.33.  Sex was also correlated with one’s intuit 
score. After accounting for familiarity with the CRT and having or being a 
candidate for a PhD in philosophy, females intuit scores were higher by 
0.26; F(1, 557) = 12.69, p < 0.001, d = 0.36. The magnitude of this corre-
lation is only slightly larger than that of having or being a candidate for a 
PhD in philosophy in the same comparison. That is, after accounting for 
sex and familiarity with the CRT, having or being a candidate for a PhD 
decreased one’s intuit score by 0.23; F(1, 557) = 14.72, p < 0.001, d = 
0.31. 
Discussion
Most of the aforementioned predictions were corroborated and all of the 
aforementioned results  were reproduced. First,  training and selection in 
philosophy resulted in better performance on the CRT—specifically, those 
who have been selected by PhD admissions committees in philosophy are 
more likely than those who have not been selected to answer reflectively 
on the CRT. Also, answering intuitively predicted a greater chance of ac-
cepting or leaning towards theism (as opposed to atheism), accepting a 
Fregean (as opposed to Russellian) view of language, accepting scientific 
anti-realism (as opposed to scientific realism) about science, choosing not 
pull the switch to save five and kill one, and to accept the physical (as op-
posed to psychological) view of personal identity. Conversely, answering 
reflectively predicted a greater chance of choosing to pull the switch to 
save five and kill one. And lastly, males were more likely to respond re-
flectively to CRT questions and females were more likely to respond intu-
itively, and, as predicted, the magnitude of these correlations with CRT 
score was similar to that of having or being a candidate for a PhD in phi-
losophy. 
The  reader  should  be  aware  that  all  of  these  correlations  were 
small—defined as d ≈ 0.3 (Cohen 1977)—albeit statistically significant, so 
one would do well to take care in interpreting these results. In what re-
mains of this section, I would like to point out some possibly confounding 
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factors of the present study, recommend some tentative conclusions, and 
then suggest directions for further research. 
First, I want to draw attention to the fact that the vast majority of 
participants came from LeiterReports.com. Since this website’s audience 
is,  primarily  academic  philosophers  or  aspiring  academic  philosophers, 
one might infer that the vast majority of participants in the present study 
probably had an academic interest  in philosophy. And since training in 
philosophy—which is probably related to having an academic interest in 
philosophy—is related to the kind of reasoning ability that helps one per-
form well on the CRT, then we should expect this sample’s CRT scores to 
be positively skewed—which seems apparent  based on the comparison 
with Frederick’s (2005) data and Livengood and colleagues’ (2010) data 
(see Figure 4). This uneven distribution might also skew other results. For 
example, perhaps the correlation between having or being a candidate for 
PhD in philosophy and CRT score is diminished by the fact that the vast 
majority of those without a PhD in philosophy have nonetheless enjoyed 
substantial  formal  training  and  even  selection  by  philosophy  depart-
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SAMPLE SCORE N
PhD in Philosophy 2.35 238
Massachusetts Institute of Philosophy 2.18 61
No PhD in Philosophy 2.07 170
Princeton University 1.63 121
Boston Fireworks Display 1.53 195
Carnegie Mellon University 1.51 746
Harvard University 1.43 51
Some Grad-level Philosophical Training 1.32 158
University of Michigan: Ann Arbor 1.18 1267
Web-based Studies 1.10 525
Bowling Green University 0.87 52
University of Michigan: Dearborn 0.83 154
Michigan State University 0.79 118
University of Toledo 0.57 138
No Philosophical Training 0.44 823
Figure 4. Comparison of CRT performance. Bolded items denote data from this study. Itali-
cized items denote data from Livengood et al 2010. All other items are from Frederick 2005. 
Most of Frederick’s respondents were undergraduates from the universities listed. 
ments—e.g., those without a PhD in philosophy might still have an under-
graduate degree in philosophy or a non-terminal graduate degree in phi-
losophy, and/or they might have partially completed a PhD in philosophy. 
This  PhD  selection  criterion  was  chosen  because  the  PhD  selection 
process is one of the earliest and most competitive selection processes of 
the various selection processes in philosophy. The idea, then, was that this 
criterion  would  do  well  to  capture  the  effect  of  one  kind  of  selection 
process in philosophy, if the effect existed. One might have reservations 
about using this criterion as opposed to, say, a criterion about whether or 
not one is employed as a philosophy instructor or professor. This seems 
like a  reasonable  reservation,  however,  the reader  should recall  that  of 
those who had or were a candidate for a PhD in philosophy, neither (a) the 
number of years one had studied philosophy nor (b) whether one had a 
teaching position in philosophy were statistically related to CRT perfor-
mance. This provides support for the claim in Section 3 that being em-
ployed or promoted in philosophy is not related to one’s reasoning compe-
tence. 
One might also have reservations about whether the PhD criterion 
captures a distinction between “philosopher” and “non-philosopher.” Per-
sonally, I take it that such a distinction—assuming it is realistic—will not 
be optimally captured by the PhD criterion. So, if one wanted to compare 
philosophers with non-philosophers, then one would do well to devise an-
other criterion that does better to draw a line between participants that are 
familiar with philosophy and those that are probably not—e.g., US high 
school  seniors  vs.  US philosophy majors  (see also Livengood and col-
leagues’ 2010 method of distinguishing levels of philosophical training).
One might also wonder if an underrepresentation of females in the 
sample has skewed some of the data. It is not perfectly clear from the data 
which results would be most affected by this uneven distribution. Perhaps 
the correlations between sex or gender and CRT performance would be 
more salient or significant if the sample were more balanced. It is worth 
noting that the sex distribution in the present sample—roughly 20% fe-
male—is loosely representative of the recent data on sex distribution in 
professional  philosophy—18.7%  female  in  2006  and  25.4%  female  in 
2009 (Buckwalter and Stich 2011).
Similarly, one might wonder if the present findings have anything 
to say about the underrepresentation of women in philosophy. Buckwalter 
and Stich (2011) argued that gender differences in intuition might help ex-
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plain the relatively low numbers of  women in professional  philosophy. 
Adleberg,  Thompson,  and  Nahmias  (2014)  tried  to  reproduce  some of 
Buckwalter and Stich’s results, but failed. One of their conclusions was 
this: if there are gender differences in philosophy, then they are not play-
ing a role in driving women to leave or avoid philosophy. It is not clear 
that the findings presented herein provide any indication of a mechanism 
that would drive women to leave or avoid philosophy. It is also unclear 
how the present findings would support the hypothesis that there are gen-
der differences in intuition among philosophers. If the present findings in-
dicate anything about gender differences in philosophy, it is only that there 
is a small difference between males’ and females’ likelihood of reporting 
an intuitive vs. a reflective response in a domain where the reflective re-
sponse should be preferred. 
But even this conclusion could be premature. It is true that, histor-
ically, male students outperformed female students in mathematics in high 
school—even though female students outperformed male students in ele-
mentary and middle school (Hyde Fennema and Lamon 1990). However, 
this performance gap was not robust; for instance, it was diminished when 
the sample included non-students (ibid.). Also, once females were taking 
as many advanced math and science courses as males and receiving as 
many undergraduate mathematics degrees as males, the gap became statis-
tically insignificant (Hyde et al 2008)—a finding which has been shown 
more  than  once  in  both  single-sex  and  coeducational  settings  (Pahlke 
Hyde and Mertz 2013). In other words the gender differences in math per-
formance  are  not  the  result  of  large  and  essential  gender  differences; 
rather, they are the result of differences in education. But perhaps other 
factors also play a role in gender differences in math performance. For ex-
ample cross-national studies show that “gender equity in school enroll-
ment, women’s share of research jobs, and women’s [governmental] repre-
sentation” in each nation are the most powerful predictors of variance in 
math performance by gender (Else-Quest Hyde and Linn 2010). These re-
sults, as well as the results herein, corroborate the gender similarities hy-
pothesis: “most psychological gender differences are in the close-to- zero 
(d ≤  0.10) or small (0.11 < d < 0.35) range, a few are in the moderate 
range (0.36 < d < 0.65), and very few are large (d < 0.66–1.00) or very 
large (d < 1.00)” (Hyde 2005). The implication is that gender differences 
in math performance are related to educational  and cultural  differences 
rather than essential gender differences. So in the case of the present study, 
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one has reason to be suspect of the claim that the present sex difference in 
performance on the CRT is an indication of some kind of essential sex dif-
ference in mathematical competence.
The final worry about these findings involves dominant views in 
philosophy. Consider the fact  that  of those who reported an inclination 
about the existence of a god, 17% reported leaning toward atheism and 
63%  reported  accepting  atheism—meaning  80%  were  inclined  toward 
atheism. This is clearly an uneven distribution, so one might be curious 
how it affects the data. One can be optimistic about the distribution’s af-
fect on statistical power since the present sample size is sufficiently large 
to contain over 100 participants who report an inclination towards theism. 
Also, the distribution in the present sample is remarkably close to the 78% 
found in the more comprehensive PhilPapers sample (Bourget et al 2009), 
so one should not be concerned about whether or not the present sample is 
representative of professional philosophers. 
There is yet another curiosity about this distribution. One might 
worry that the quantitative dominance of atheists is the result of some kind 
of indoctrination effect during the training and/or selection of philosophers 
(Cronk God Is Not Dead). After all, philosophical training and selection is 
related  to  philosophers’ outstanding reflective  competence  and philoso-
phers’ outstanding  reflective  competence  is  related  to  a  disposition  to-
wards  atheism,  so  this  worry  seems  prima  facie  reasonable.  However, 
there are reasons to dispel this worry. First, having or being a candidate for 
a  PhD in philosophy was not  significantly  related to  one’s  inclinations 
about the existence of a god. Second, 70% of philosophers who report phi-
losophy of religion as an area of specialization are theists (De Cruz 2012). 
In other words, philosophical training or selection does not seem to be re-
lated to philosophers’ views about the existence of a god; it is philoso-
phers’ interests or specializations that seem to be so related. One might 
wonder if similar analyses of other dominant views in philosophy (e.g., 
moral realism) would dismiss other misconceptions of philosophy. 
Before turning to conclusions, I want to briefly mention some im-
portant  differences  between  the  present  study  and  Livengood  and  col-
leagues’ study  (2010).  The  most  obvious  difference  is  that  the  present 
study considers correlations between CRT performance and philosophical 
disposition. In addition to this difference, the present study seems to indi-
cate significantly higher performance, on average, than the Livengood et al 
study. It might be that having relatively fewer non-philosopher and female 
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participants in the present study could account for some of this difference. 
Another factor that might account for this difference is the fact that Liven-
good and colleagues controlled for overall education and age while I did 
not.  Another  interesting  difference  between  Livengood  and  colleagues’ 
study and the present study is the effect of philosophical training on CRT 
performance. Livengood and colleagues report that the average CRT score 
of participants with graduate-level philosophical training—Ŷ = 1.32—was 
about three times greater than the average CRT score of participants with-
out philosophical training—Ŷ  = 0.44. This seemingly massive disparity 
would not be possible without the alarmingly low average CRT score of 
subjects  without  philosophical  training.  Another  possible  cause  of  this 
large mean difference is the fact that Livengood and colleagues’ might not 
have controlled for participants’ previous familiarity with the CRT ques-
tions  or  answers.  In  the  present  study,  familiarity  with  CRT questions 
turned out to be the most powerful  predictor of both CRT score—F(1, 
557) = 10.58, p < 0.01, d = 0.37, b = 0.33—and intuit score—F(1, 557) = 
12.52, p < 0.001, d = 0.4, b = -0.29—even after accounting for one’s sex 
and whether one had or was a candidate for a PhD in philosophy. So, one 
might wonder whether such a control would diminish the relatively larger 
differences in CRT score reported by Livengood and colleagues. 
Conclusions
Let us now consider some tentative conclusions. First, the present results 
are not sufficiently robust to draw sweeping conclusions about the overall 
rationality of various groups—e.g., PhDs in philosophy vs. others, males 
vs. females, etc. The reason for this has been mentioned more than once: 
rationality might  be domain-dependent.  So,  the rational  strategy on the 
CRT, to respond reflectively, might not be the best strategy in another do-
main or across multiple domains (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009, Gigeren-
zer and Gaissmaier 2011). Second, the present study does corroborate the 
prediction that  training and selection in philosophy is  related to an in-
crease in one kind of reasoning competence—i.e., competency in respond-
ing reflectively rather than intuitively when it is rational to do so. Interest-
ingly, the present results indicate that being hired or promoted in philoso-
phy is not related to this kind of reasoning competence. Third, the present 
study corroborates the prediction that differences in reasoning competence 
are related to philosophical beliefs, even among those who have received 
the benefits of philosophical training and selection. This corroboration is 
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the most tenuous, however,  because the reported correlations are rather 
small.
Future Research
Having reviewed the tentative conclusions and some constraining factors, 
I have only to mention some suggestions for further research. First, I sug-
gest—following Shenhav Rand and Greene 2012—that the potential ef-
fects of intuitive or reflective priming on philosophers’ responses to philo-
sophical questions and scenarios be investigated. Specifically, I propose a 
2x2 between subjects design, in which participants are randomly assigned 
to an intuition-eliciting, an intuition-inhibiting, a reflection-eliciting, or a 
reflection-inhibiting prime followed by a manipulation check. After this, 
subjects would be presented with whatever material would serve as the 
dependent variable: questions either about one’s position on major philo-
sophical views or about scenarios (e.g., thought experiments about identi-
ty,  causality,  mindedness,  responsibility,  etc.).  One  might  also  turn  the 
proposed study into a 2x2x2 design by testing the difference between an-
other pair of groups: philosophers and non-philosophers. It might even be 
useful  to  split  philosophers  into  multiple  groups—e.g.,  undergraduates, 
graduate students,  non-tenure track faculty, tenure-track faculty, tenured 
faculty,  and emeritus faculty—to see if  there are any interesting differ-
ences between these groups.
And since certain personality traits have been shown to be related 
to political orientation (Arvan 2011, 2012, Mondak and Conache 2014), 
views about moral responsibility (Schulz Cokely and Feltz 2011), and rea-
soning style (Messick and Fritzky 1963, Paccini and Epstein 1999), I want 
to propose studies of the potential relationships between personality traits, 
reasoning styles, and philosophical dispositions. The study could involve a 
brief presentation of the dependent variable—again, questions either about 
one’s position on major philosophical views or about scenarios—and then 
proceed to present a Big Five personality assessment (Gosling et al 2003) 
and the CRT (Frederick 2005).
Before closing, I want to mention a more ambitious proposal for 
further research. There is a growing body of research showing that differ-
ences in brain anatomy and function correlate with differences in respons-
es to, judgments about, and orientation in particular areas of philosophy. 
For example, it seems that differences in brain anatomy and/or function 
are related to differences in political orientation (Amodio et al 2007, Kanai 
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et al 2011, Koenigs et al 2007, Tusche et al 2013), differences in judg-
ments about mindedness (Jack et  al  2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2014),  differ-
ences in moral judgment (Moll and Oliviera-Souza 2007, Moll et al 2005, 
Young et al 2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2011), and differences in reasoning about 
religion (Kapogiannis et al 2009). This research has done well to reveal 
how various reasoning systems are related—e.g., moral reasoning and rea-
soning about other minds (Gray Young and Waytz 2012)—in lay reason-
ers. Also there has been inspiring research on how the brain realizes vari-
ous kinds of reasoning (Goel 2007, Goel and Dolan 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 
2004, Goel and Grafman 2000, Goel and Vartanian 2005, Goel et al 1998, 
2000). By adding groups of philosophers to studies in the cognitive neuro-
science of reasoning, one might achieve greater clarity on whether or not
—and how—judgments and intuitions differ  both between  philosophers 
and non-philosophers and within philosophers. 
6.  CONCLUSION
This paper began with a brief discussion of how cognitive science 
has provided reasons to doubt traditional conceptions of human rationality. 
This discussion of what counts as rational and whether or not humans are 
optimally rational is clearly not settled. But out of the same research from 
which these concerns about rationality were borne came dual-process ac-
counts of reasoning, learning, deciding, etc. These dual-process accounts 
of reasoning have helped to characterize the intuitive-reflective dichotomy 
found  in  philosophical  reasoning.  Also,  the  CRT helped  to  reveal  that 
philosophers are outstandingly competent in arbitrating between reflective 
and intuitive responses such that philosophers are more likely to respond 
reflectively when it is rational to do so. The fact that training and selection 
in philosophy is negatively correlated with making such systematic errors 
seems to indicate that some of the worries about the use of intuition in phi-
losophy—e.g., that responding intuitively is irrational because it can lead 
to systematic errors on the CRT—can be mitigated. 
Still, the present findings also suggest that training or selection in 
philosophy does not completely eliminate the proclivity for systematic er-
rors in arbitrating between intuitive and reflective responses. My conclu-
sion, then, involves ascribing a mitigated privilege to philosophers’ ability 
to rationally arbitrate between intuitive and reflective responses. After all, 
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the present study provides at least prima facie reasons to think that philo-
sophical training and selection result in being more likely to rationally ar-
bitrate between intuitive and reflective responses. Nonetheless, the present 
study also provides prima facie reason to think that, as a rule, “intuitions 
should not be embraced [unreflectively]” (Huemer 2005, 105). 
There is one important disclaimer I should make before wrapping 
up: I have not suggested that philosophical training and selection might 
improve  the  quality  of  one’s  intuitions  (Knobe  and  Samuels  2013, 
Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012, Stotz et al forthcoming, Tobia Buckwal-
ter and Stich 2012, Tobia Chapman and Stich 2013, Weinberg et al 2010, 
Williamson 2011). Instead, I am claiming that philosophical training and/
or selection might improve one’s ability to rationally adjudicate between 
intuition and reflection.
The reader will perhaps be surprised or disappointed that I have 
not  arrived at  a  conclusion about  when intuitions should count  as  evi-
dence, when intuitions should ground non-empirical claims, or when ap-
pealing to intuitions is rational. I confess that I share a portion of that sur-
prise and disappointment. If I am honest, I began thinking about philo-
sophical reasoning a few years ago with the hope of providing both empir-
ical evidence and a knockdown argument against the method of appealing 
to intuition in philosophy. While some of my research in cognitive science 
and philosophy has supported my suspicions about appealing to intuitions, 
it has also eroded my confidence in full-blown “intuition-bashing” projects 
(Bealer 1998).
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